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The relationship between working memory (WM) and attention is a highly interdependent
one, with evidence that attention determines the state in which items in WM are retained.
Through focusing of attention, an item might be held in a more prioritized state, commonly
termed as the focus of attention (FOA). The remaining items, although still retrievable, are
considered to be in a different representational state. One means to bring an item into
the FOA is to use retrospective cues (“retro-cues”) which direct attention to one of the
objects retained in WM. Alternatively, an item can enter a privileged state once attention
is directed towards it through bottom-up influences (e.g., recency effect) or by performing
an action on one of the retained items (“incidental” cueing). In all these cases, the item
in the FOA is recalled with better accuracy compared to the other items in WM. Far less
is known about the nature of the other items in WM and whether they can be flexibly
manipulated in and out of the FOA. We present data from three types of experiments as
well as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to early visual cortex to manipulate the
item inside FOA. Taken together, our results suggest that the context in which items are
retained in WM matters. When an item remains behaviorally relevant, despite not being
inside the FOA, re-focusing attention upon it can increase its recall precision. This suggests
that a non-FOA item can be held in a state in which it can be later retrieved. However, if an
item is rendered behaviorally unimportant because it is very unlikely to be probed, it cannot
be brought back into the FOA, nor recalled with high precision. Under such conditions,
some information appears to be irretrievably lost from WM. These findings, obtained from
several different methods, demonstrate quite considerable flexibility with which items in
WM can be represented depending upon context. They have important consequences for
emerging state-dependent models of WM.
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INTRODUCTION
Working memory (WM) refers to the ability to hold and
manipulate information in mind for brief periods of time
(Baddeley, 2003). It has been proposed that not all information in
WM is maintained in an equal state. For example, depending on
task relevance such as likelihood of being probed, one item might
require prioritization over others. These sorts of considerations
have led some authors to argue that the state of WM representa-
tions might be determined by an interaction between long-term
memory (LTM) and attention (e.g., Cowan, 1998; McElree, 1998;
Oberauer, 2002).
While these models differ in how the capacity and nature of
representations in various states are determined (see Larocque
et al., 2014 for a comprehensive review), they all agree on
the existence of least two distinct states. One of these states
has attention focused on an item (or a subset of items),
rendering it in a more prioritized state so that it can be
accessed more readily, with higher accuracy and/or fidelity (e.g.,
Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Pertzov et al., 2012; Zokaei et al.,
2014). In line with the most prominent theoretical models, we
will refer to these prioritized items as being inside a focus
of attention (FOA; as defined by Cowan, 1998; Oberauer,
2002, 2009). The remaining items outside FOA—although still
retrievable—are considered to be in a different representational
state (Figure 1).
The distinction between the items inside and outside FOA
has been demonstrated both empirically (Lewis-Peacock et al.,
2011; LaRocque et al., 2013; Stokes et al., 2013) and theoretically,
often described in terms of the activated LTM proportion of short
term memory (e.g., Oberauer, 2002). A substantial amount of
research has focused on the qualities of representations of the
item in FOA, but far less is known about the nature of the other
items. One important but outstanding question that we address
in this study is whether items can flexibly move in and out of
FOA.
MANIPULATION OF REPRESENTATIONAL STATES IN WM
Behaviorally, the item in FOA is identified as the item that is
recalled faster and more accurately compared to other retained
items (see Nee and Jonides, 2013; Larocque et al., 2014 for
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of items maintained in visual
WM in two different representational states. Although multiple items can
be maintained in WM (lower panel), one item (red object in top pane) might
be held in a more prioritized state known as the “focus of attention” (FOA).
examples). There are various methods for manipulating represen-
tational states in WM that result in such a behavioral advantage.
In this section, we review selected studies that have used various
approaches to shed light on the nature of the item in FOA and as
a consequence on the other, non-focused items.
Retro-cues shift the focus of attention in WM
A commonly used means to bring an item into FOA is the use of
retrospective cues (“retro-cues”) presented during the retention
interval, with the intention of directing attention to one specific
item in WM. Specifically, a retro-cue will indicate to the partic-
ipant which item is highly likely to be probed for recognition or
recall. A consequence of retro cues is higher accuracy or precision
of recall for the cued item compared to other uncued or invalidly
cued items (Griffin and Nobre, 2003; Lepsien and Nobre, 2007;
Makovsik and Jiang, 2007; Sligte et al., 2008, 2010; Astle et al.,
2009; Lepsien et al., 2011; Berryhill et al., 2012; Pertzov et al.,
2012).
Some studies have further attempted to characterize the
neural underpinnings of the item in FOA achieved through
retro-cueing (e.g., Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Harrison and
Tong, 2009; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2011; Nelissen et al., 2013;
Larocque et al., 2014). In one such investigation, participants
were presented with a sequence of two images to remember
from two different categories of faces and scenes (Lepsien and
Nobre, 2007). After a retention period they were shown a
retro-cue indicating the relevant item for the upcoming mem-
ory probe. Event-related functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) demonstrated that orienting attention to one of
the items during WM maintenance modulated the activity in
region of the brain involved in perception of the cued item:
fusiform face area for faces and parahippocampal place area for
scenes.
Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA; e.g., Haxby
et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2006) some investigators have
reported stimulus-specific patterns in early visual areas dur-
ing WM retention for retro-cued items. In a landmark study
Harrison and Tong (2009) demonstrated that the orienta-
tion of the Gabor patch retro-cued during WM maintenance
(from two retained orientations) could be decoded from the
activity patterns in visual areas V1-V4. Nelissen et al. (2013)
employed a similar retro-cueing WM task and showed that
cued items could be accurately decoded from occipitotempo-
ral cortex, but that decoding was at chance level for the un-
cued items (Nelissen et al., 2013; See also Lewis-Peacock et al.,
2011).
From these findings one can conclude that the retro-cued item
is maintained in a different state compared to non-cued items,
with its maintenance dependent, at least to some extent, on early
visual cortical regions known to be involved in perception of the
maintained information.
Recency: last item in the focus of attention
Many investigations of WM present items serially rather than
simultaneously. It has been known for a long time that the last
item in a sequence is better recalled than previous ones: the
recency effect. Some authors argue that the most recent item is in
fact automatically in the FOA. Evidence comes from behavioral
studies demonstrating retrieval advantage for the most recent
item compared to items presented earlier in the sequence (McEl-
ree and Dosher, 1989, 1993; Neath, 1993; Hay et al., 2007; Blalock
and Clegg, 2010). Furthermore, this last item is recalled faster,
with more accuracy and precision compared to all previous items,
with the magnitude of recency effect dependent on the number of
previous items in the sequence (Gorgoraptis et al., 2011; Zokaei
et al., 2011). Thus, the well-known recency effect in the WM
literature might be due to the obligatory assignment of the last
item to the FOA.
Brain imaging techniques have shed light on possible dis-
sociation in neural correlates for maintenance of the last item
compared to earlier items in a sequence. Using fMRI, Nee and
Jonides (2008) investigated the probed-evoked neural signal of
the most recently presented word compared to words presented
earlier in a sequence. The recognition of the last item was accom-
panied by increased activation in the inferior temporal cortex.
Similar findings have been presented in later studies (Nee and
Jonides, 2011, 2013). Furthermore, recognition of the last word
in the memory sequence was accompanied by less hippocampal
activation when compared to recognition of all previous items
in a sequence leading to intriguing suggestion that non-focused
items are maintained by the hippocampus (Oztekin et al., 2009,
2010). Hence, there is both behavioral and neural evidence for
dissociation of the most recent item into WM compared to
previous items.
In addition recent findings using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) have provided causal evidence for differ-
ent representational states in visual WM (Zokaei et al., 2014).
Two random dot kinematograms (RDKs) moving in differ-
ent directions were presented sequentially, with the aim of
bringing the second RDK into FOA. Following a delay period,
participants had to recall the direction of one of the two
previously-presented RDKs. Transcranial magnetic stimulation
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was administered during the delay of the WM task, prior to the
presentation of the probe, to motion sensitive area MT+ which
was hypothesized to be maintaining the remembered motion
directions (Bisley and Pasternak, 2000; Pasternak and Greenlee,
2005). Transcranial magnetic stimulation impaired recall preci-
sion of the motion direction in FOA and, crucially, conversely
improved precision for the other non-focused direction (Zokaei
et al., 2014). These findings provide some of the first causal
evidence that there are at least two representational states, with the
maintenance of only the item in FOA relying on an area involved
in its perception.
Incidental-cueing brings an item into focus of attention
A new method for manipulating representational states in WM
has recently been developed; incidental cueing. This approach
is different to the retro-cueing approach, because the cue is not
explicitly predictive of upcoming memory recall. Instead, the
rationale is that once an item from those maintained in WM is
used for a cognitive operation that is incidental or orthogonal to
the memory requirements of the task, that item will automatically
enter the FOA.
In the study by Zokaei et al. (2014) participants were once
again presented with two RDKs now simultaneously, above and
below a fixation cross, and in two different colors. Participants
were required to remember the directions of motion of each of the
RDKs. During the delay period, the fixation cross changed to the
color of one of the maintained motion directions and participants
indicated with a key press the location of the motion direction of
that color in the memory array, i.e., whether it had been above or
below the fixation cross. The color of the fixation cross was not
informative of the upcoming memory probe, and the judgment
about the location of one of the RDKs was completely orthogonal
to the requirement to remember the direction of motion of the
RDKs. Nevertheless, adding this incidental task, resulted in higher
precision of recall of the motion direction that also matched the
color of the fixation cross. Thus, this item appeared to be in
FOA simply by virtue of being “incidentally” cued. In agreement
with the results from the TMS experiment described above, TMS
applied here during the delay period, after the incidental cue, also
disrupted recall of the cued item, and improved it for the non-
cued item.
A similar rationale was employed by Lewis-Peacock et al.
(2011) who used a dual response and cueing WM task adapted
from Oberauer (2005). Following a delay after presentation of
the memory array, a cue appeared highlighting the first item
to be probed. After the response, a second retro-cue appeared
that indicated either the same item as that previously probed or
alternatively cued the participant to switch to the other item in
WM. For this second cue, only the task-relevant item (the cued
item) could be successfully decoded from the fMRI BOLD signal,
whereas the irrelevant (non-cued) item could not. This occurred
despite no behavioral loss in performance when the second cue
was different to the first (Lewis-Peacock et al., 2011, see LaRocque
et al., 2013 for electroencephalography (EEG) analog).
The findings reported in this section provide evidence for the
existence of a FOA within WM representations: an item can be
held in a more privileged state with its recall more accurate and
with higher precision compared to all other items maintained in
WM. But what about the other items in WM? What happens to
them and how are they stored?
THE FATE OF ITEMS OUTSIDE THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION IN WM
We now turn to investigations of how the items outside FOA are
represented relative to those inside FOA. One hypothesis is that
the item in FOA is protected from interference from un-cued
items, with this protection coming at a cost for remembering
un-cued items. Pertzov et al. (2012) simultaneously presented
four oriented bars of different color and asked participants to
remember their orientation. One of the bars was subsequently
probed by its location or color. During the retention period, a
retro-cue appeared indicating the item that was most likely to
be later probed (70% validity). In the subsequent recall period,
participants were asked to reproduce the exact orientation of
one of the bars. Precision of recall was significantly worse for the
invalidly cued trials (i.e., trials where one of the un-cued items
were probed) compared to trials in which the probe was validly
cued, and also to baseline trials in which there was no cue.
These results were interpreted as evidence for the validly cued
item being in a state that was protected from interference by
other items held in WM, with these other objects suffering from
accelerated temporal decay. Similar findings have been reported
by Lepsien and Nobre (2007) and Matsukura et al. (2007). In
the latter study, participants were presented with two consec-
utive retro-cues, with the second cue 100% valid. The second
cue could be same or different to the first. Two identical cues
resulted in similar performance to a single valid retro-cue, while
two different cues impaired performance. The authors explained
their findings in terms of forgetting un-cued items due to either
degradation or interference, alongside protection of the cued
item.
Evidence for the degradation of un-cued items is, however,
inconsistent. In WM change detection tasks, several studies report
no significant impairment in recall of the un-cued information
with two consecutive cues during the delay (Landman et al., 2003;
Rerko and Oberauer, 2013). For example, Rerko and Oberauer
(2013) presented participants with a memory array followed by
either a single, two or three cues. The probed matched (50%
trials) or mismatched the item that was cued last. There was no
difference in accuracy between the cued and un-cued items.
The discrepancy in behavioral findings for memory of
un-cued items may be explained by the degree of information
conveyed by the cue. In tasks that show an effect on un-cued
information (i.e., impaired performance in recalling those items)
the cue carries predictive information indicating which will be
the most relevant item—often the only one relevant item—
for forthcoming memory recall. As a consequence, un-cued
information is rendered behaviorally irrelevant because of the
low probability that it will need to be accessed again. In effect, this
therefore changes the task to WM for a single (cued) item only.
On the other hand, in studies that have failed to find an
effect on un-cued items (i.e., recall/recognition accuracy is no
different to cued items), participants did not need to attend to
previous cues, but rather the last cue only (e.g., Landman et al.,
2003; Rerko and Oberauer, 2013). Thus, only the final cue was
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informative with respect to the upcoming probe, and importantly
with only 50% validity. It could therefore be argued that given the
low amount of predictive information conveyed by the cue, it was
rendered less effective compared to retro-cues with, for example,
70% validity. Moreover, in these studies the final cue was followed
by a very short delay (<500 ms) prior to the presentation of
the probe. But for a retro-cue to produce sufficient behavioral
advantage, there should be at least 1 s between the presentation
of the cue and the memory probe (Pertzov et al., 2012).
RECALL OF ITEMS NOT IN FOCUS OF ATTENTION
From the studies described above it is evident that research has
mainly centered on the single, privileged item in FOA. As a
consequence, far less is known about the nature of non-focused
items, and whether these items can be brought back into FOA
or are lost from memory. In light of previous findings, one can
hypothesize that whether items can flexibly move in and out of
the FOA might be highly dependent on their potential relevance
to the task in hand. Thus, if a non-focused item has a high chance
of being probed it might still be maintained in a state such that it
can be retrieved with high quality.
We tested this hypothesis across four experiments in which
we used a method for measuring WM performance that relies on
participants to reproduce the exact qualities of the retained infor-
mation, providing a measure of precision of recall (Gorgoraptis
et al., 2011; Zokaei et al., 2011, 2013). Such sensitive measure
of WM allows us to detect small changes in recall precision that
may otherwise not be detectable with alternative measures. In
the first two experiments we used cues that were orthogonal to
the WM task at hand. We hypothesized that these cues would
allow items to move flexibly in and out of the FOA, since they
carry no information regarding the relevance of items in WM.
On the other hand, in experiment 3 and 4, a retro-cue with 80%
validity was used. Unlike the first two experiments, we predicted
that in such a situation, non-focused (un-cued) items in WM
might degrade to the extent that they cannot be brought back into
FOA.
In our first two experiments we aimed to examine whether
representational states of items in WM can flexibly change in
situations in which all items in WM remain potentially, behav-
iorally relevant throughout the trial. In Experiment 1 we used
two successive incidental cues while in Experiment 2, we used
sequential presentation of items so that the last item was in FOA
by virtue of recency. This was then followed by an incidental cue
that could be same or different to the last item in the sequence.
Note that this method of cueing always required participants to
make a response, allowing us to confirm whether they attended to
the cued item or not, rather than relying on participants to attend
to the cue of their own volition, with no objective measure (e.g.,
Landman et al., 2003; Pertzov et al., 2012; Rerko and Oberauer,
2013).
EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECTS OF ONE OR TWO INCIDENTAL CUES
METHODS
Participants
Twenty healthy individuals (13 male) with an average age of
27 (range: 19–35) participated. All had normal or corrected to
normal vision and reported normal color vision. They provided
written consent to the procedure of the experiment, which was
approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli
On each trial, two RDKs were presented below and above the
fixation cross, subtending 10◦ of visual angle. Each RDK consisted
of 50 dots (0.1◦ visual angle each), displayed within an invisible
circular aperture (5.7◦ of visual angle). The color of the top RDK
was chosen at random on each trial to be either green or red, with
the lower RDK assigned the other color (red or green).
Dot lifetime and density were constant during RDK
presentation with 100% coherent motion (constant speed of
4.5◦/s). Motion direction for each RDK was selected from 0–360◦
with no angular separation between the two motion directions
on each trial. A mask consisting of 5000 dots (50% red), covering
the entire screen was presented immediately after RDK offset.
Stimuli were displayed on 14.1” display (resolution 800 × 600
pixels, refresh rate 60 Hz). Participants were seated approximately
60 cm from the monitor in a dimly lit room.
Procedure
A schematic representation of the task and different conditions
is illustrated in Figure 2. Each trial started with a fixation cross
(500 ms), followed by the presentation of two RDKs (the memory
array for 300 ms) and mask (100 ms). In this experiment, cues
could be presented at two different time points, referred to as 1st
position and 2nd position cues.
In the baseline condition (1/9th of trials and not shown in the
figure), the RDKs were simply followed by 7.2 s blank interval
before presentation of probe stimuli. In 4/9th of trials, the stimuli
were followed by a blank delay (1 s) and then the fixation cross
briefly changed to either red or green (100 ms) which served as
our method of incidental cueing. Participants had to indicate with
a key press as accurately and as fast as possible the location of the
RDK (above or below fixation cross) that was the same color as
the fixation cross.
On half these trials (i.e., 2/9th of the overall trials), the cue was
followed by a 6.1 s blank interval before the presentation of the
probe (One cue, 1st condition—Figure 2A). On the remainder of
the trials (2/9th of the overall number of trials), the memory array
was followed by a 4.1 s delay, then the incidental cue (100 ms) and
another delay (3 s) before the presentation of the probe (One cue,
2nd position—Figure 2B).
In the remaining trials (4/9th of the overall trials), the cue was
followed by 3 s delay before the presentation of a second incidental
cue which could be the same (Figure 2C) or different color
(Figure 2D) to the first cue (Two cues condition). Participants
were informed that the cue was orthogonal to the memory task.
The memory probe was a circle (5.7◦ visual angle in diameter)
presented at the center of the screen with a line from the center
positioned at a randomly-selected orientation. On trials with one
incidental cue and those with two identical colored cues, the color
of the probe was the same (50% of trials—congruent) or different
(incongruent) to the color of the incidental cue(s).
In trials with two differently colored cues, on half the trials the
probe was same color as the first cue while on the remaining the
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic and baseline corrected WM recall performance of
trial events for Experiment 1. Two items were presented in the memory
array. This was then followed by (A) an incidental cue in the first position; (B)
an incidental cue in the second position; (C) two identical consecutive
incidental cues or (D) two different consecutive incidental cues, before the
presentation of the memory probe. Error bars are SEM.
trials it was presented in the same color as the second cue. Using
a mouse, participants adjusted the orientation of the line within
the circle until it matched the direction of motion of the probed
RDK. Accuracy of this matching procedure was emphasized over
response time. Participants completed a practice block (30 trials)
followed by seven blocks of 36 trials, different conditions ran-
domly intermixed within a block.
Precision calculation
Recall error for the memory for motion task was calculated as
the difference in response angle from target angle (i.e., the actual
angle of the probed item). Recall precision was defined as the
reciprocal of standard deviation of response error (Philipp, 2009).
Note that precision is a measure of variability with higher preci-
sion corresponding to lower variability in memory. Due to small
number of trials for all experiments reported here, we were unable
to perform mixture modeling (Bays et al., 2009) to dissect our the
sources of error resulting in a specific pattern of performance.
RESULTS
Participant performed the incidental cueing task with a high level
of accuracy over all conditions (see Table 1 for mean accuracy
and response times for all conditions). Trials in which there
were incorrect responses to incidental cues were excluded from
analysis.
We examined memory recall precision of motion direction for
congruent vs. incongruent trials, corrected by performance in the
baseline (no cue) condition in conditions where only one memory
item was incidentally cued (i.e., the 1cue conditions, and two cues
of the same color). There was an overall significant main effect of
congruency, of whether the memory probe was about the same
or different item to that specified by the previous incidental cue
(F(1,19) = 11.06, p = 0.004). Thus recall precision was lower in the
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. This occurred
in conditions when an incidental cue was presented in the first
position (t(19) = 3.7, p = 0.001, Figure 2A), or second position
(marginal significance, t(19) = 1.8, p = 0.084, Figure 2B) or when
two cues of the same color were presented (t(19) = 2.27, p = 0.035,
Figure 2C). The incongruency effect for an incidental cue in the
second position was marginally significant (t(19) = 1.8, p = 0.084,
Figure 2B). These findings indicate successful incidental cueing.
Performing the incidental task (which is orthogonal to the
motion direction memory task) made a systematic difference to
recall precision on the memory task, depending on congruency
of incidental cue to the RDK that was later probed.
Importantly, the cueing advantage was apparently driven by
a decrease in recall precision on incongruent trials, compared to
congruent trials. Compared to no-cue baseline condition (zero
in figures), there were marginally significant decreases in recall
precision on incongruent trials when one cue occupied the 1st
position (t(19) = 1.89, p = 0.07, Figure 2A) and when two cues of
the same color were presented (t(19) = 2.08, p = 0.051, Figure 2C).
There was a significant drop in recall precision for incongruent
trials when one cue occupied the 2nd position (t(19) = 2.28,
p = 0.035, Figure 2B).
The critical condition, however, was when participants were
presented with a sequence of two differently colored incidental
cues. Note that in this case, we can consider the data in terms
of whether the probe was the same as the item specified by the
first incidental cue, or whether it was the same as the second
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Table 1 | Mean accuracy and response times for the two cues for all conditions (accuracy in percentage and response times in ms).
Probe type 1 cue, 1st position 1 cue, 2nd position 2 cues, same 2 cues, different
Same Different Same Different Same Different 1st item 2nd item
Cue 1
Accuracy (%) 83 87 n/a n/a 85 87 89 86
RT (ms) 742 730 715 723 730 722
Cue 2
Accuracy (%) n/a n/a 86 84 86 85 89 88
RT (ms) 699 709 629 653 579 575
cue. Prior to the second cue, one item would be considered to
be in FOA. After it, however, another item might be brought
into the FOA. This now becomes the “focused” item. Importantly
recall precision for this item was neither significantly different
to the no-cue/baseline (t(19) = 0.2, p = 0.85), nor to when a
single cue was presented in 2nd position (t(19) = 0.3, p = 0.8;
Figure 2D).
This finding shows that relatively high quality information
regarding “other” items in WM—at least, similar to the baseline
state—can be retrieved, in the context of a task where partici-
pants know that they might be asked to switch their attention
between items in WM. This occurred despite the fact that such
items were recalled with lower precision when they had not been
brought into the privileged state of FOA by incidental cueing
(Figures 2A–C).
Precision of recall for the “defocused” item in this condition,
that is the item specified by the first cue and considered to be in
FOA prior to the second cue was also no different than baseline
(t(19) = 0.2, p = 0.83, Figure 2D) or to the item that was brought
into FOA by the second cue (t(19) = 0.02, p = 0.99, Figure 2D).
The lack of an effect on this item is discussed below.
DISCUSSION
These results demonstrate that in situations where items out-
side FOA remain potentially behaviorally relevant, they can be
brought into FOA. The no cue, baseline condition used here
allowed us to examine whether the effect of incidental cueing
on WM performance was due to improvement of the item in
FOA, or a degradation of the item outside it. The findings pre-
sented here show that the incidental cueing advantage can be
explained specifically by a decrease in recall precision for the
item outside FOA—rather than an advantage for the focused
item—compared to baseline. So performing a task that requires
consideration of the item specified by the incidental cue leads
to a degradation of memory of the other item in WM, but no
simultaneous boost to the cued item. Thus incidental cueing
appears to operate in a very specific manner on the contents of
WM.
A second important issue in these experiments is the fate of
the de-focused item, that is the item that was inside FOA before
the participant’s attention was switched to another item as the
trial progresses. Here, recall precision for the defocused item was
comparable to baseline, as well as focused condition—but not
worse. This might not be predicted on the basis of attention being
drawn away from this item and instead raises the possibility that
the capacity of FOA is larger than 1 item.
EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECTS OF INCIDENTAL CUE ON RECENCY
In the second experiment we aimed to examine whether repre-
sentational states of items in WM can flexibly change in situations
in which all items in WM remain potentially, behaviorally relevant
throughout the trial using a different method. Here, we used
sequential presentation of items so that the last item was in FOA
by virtue of recency. This was then followed by an incidental cue
that could be same or different to the last item.
METHODS
Participants and stimuli
Seventeen healthy individuals (10 male) with an average age
of 25 (range: 20–31) participated in Experiment 2. On each
trial, two RDKs, consisting ether of red or green mov-
ing dots, were now presented sequentially at screen center
(Figure 3A), subtending 10◦ of visual angle. Random dot kine-
matograms stimulus parameters were otherwise unchanged from
Experiment 1.
Procedure
Each RDK was presented for 300 ms (+100 ms mask). There
was 1000 ms blank delay between the two RDKs. In the baseline
condition (not illustrated in the figure—1/3 of the overall trials),
the 2nd RDK was then followed by an unfilled delay of 4.1 s. When
cues were presented, the last RDK in the sequence was followed by
a delay (1 s) before the presentation of the incidental cue (100 ms),
which matched the first RDK in 50% of the trials (1/3 of the
overall trials) and the last item for the remaining trials. In this
experiment, unlike the previous one, participants had to indicate
with a key press the serial position (first or second) of the RDK
with the same color as the incidental cue. There was a 3 s delay,
which was then followed by the presentation of the probe.
The probe was in the same color as the first RDK on half of the
trials and in the remaining trials, it matched the last item in the
sequence. This therefore resulted in four experimental conditions
with a 2 × 2 design with color of incidental cue as the first factor
and probe color as the second factor, both with two levels: color
matching the first or second item in the sequence. Participants
completed a practice block (30 trials) followed by seven blocks
of 30 trials, different conditions randomly intermixed within a
block.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Schematic of trial events for Experiment 2. Following a
sequential presentation of the memory array, the maintenance period was
either blank or included an incidental cue before the presentation of the
memory probe. (B) Recall precision for motion direction across conditions.
Error bars are SEM.
RESULTS
Participant performed the incidental cueing task well, with mean
accuracy of 95% (SD = 5.3) and mean response time of 878 ms
(SD = 200 ms). Trials with incorrect response in the incidental
cueing task were excluded from further analysis.
We next investigated the effect of incidental cueing on precision
of recall of the item in FOA compared to other items in WM. In
the baseline condition, we obtained the long-established recency
effect: the last item was recalled with greater precision than the
first. In trials when the first item—presumed not be in the FOA
by the end of the sequence—was later cued by the incidental
cue, there was a significant interaction between cueing conditions
(baseline, cue 1st item, cue last item) and serial order (F(2,32) =
9.4, p = 0.001).
Comparison of the baseline, no-cue condition to incidentally
cueing the 1st item, revealed a significant interaction between
cueing condition and serial order (F(1,16) = 16.4, p = 0.001,
Figure 3B.1). This was due to an increase in recall precision for
the first item in the sequence (t(16) = 2.3, p = 0.035)—i.e., for the
item now presumed to be in FOA—with a corresponding decrease
in precision for the last, normally privileged, item (t(16) = 2.8,
p = 0.012). This replicates our previous findings highlighting that
in the context of an experiment where a non-privileged item in
WM might be probed, it can be retrieved with relatively high
precision after focusing attention upon it. In this experiment,
unlike the first, we also found a cost in recall of the item that
would otherwise be recalled with greater fidelity, here the last one
in the sequence.
In trials where the last item in the sequence was cued, there
was no significant interaction between cueing condition (cueing
last item vs. baseline) and serial order of the probed item. The
last item could not be recalled with any greater precision than
in the baseline condition. As for the first item, although there
was a modest increase in recall precision, this was not significant
(t(16) = 1.8, p = 0.087, Figure 3B.2). It is possible that the small
increase in recall precision for the first item was due to rehearsal
of items once the last item was cued, before making a response
regarding its serial position. Participants might go through the
sequence in their mind, resulting in refocusing on the first item
before focusing on the last item in the sequence. In fact, response
times to incidental cues of the last item in the sequence was
marginally longer compared to trials where the 1st item in the
sequence is cued (t(16) = 1.9, p = 0.078).
DISCUSSION
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 confirm our general
hypothesis that in situations where items outside FOA remain
potentially behaviorally relevant, they can be brought into FOA.
In Experiment 2, precision of memory decreased for the last
item (i.e., the item presumed to be in FOA) in trials where the
incidental cue directed attention to the first item, which was now
recalled with greater precision than baseline (Figure 3B.1). This
simultaneous cost vs. benefit effect is different to that observed in
Experiment 1 where recall precision for the defocused item was
comparable to baseline, as well as focused condition. However, it
is important to note that the effects of Experiment 1 were overall
weaker (perhaps due to a much longer delay between encoding
and probing of memory than in Experiment 2: 7.2 s vs. 4.1); this
could possibly influence the lack of any effect of the de-focused
item in the previous experiment.
The effects observed in Experiment 2 might be explained
by two different mechanisms. It is possible that the capacity of
the FOA is limited, perhaps to just one item, so that in trials
where attention shifts to focus on another item in memory, the
previously privileged item is displaced from FOA. However, this
hypothesis would be inconsistent with some previous observa-
tions. Specifically, Rerko and Oberauer (2013) demonstrated an
opposite effect for the defocused item than that reported here,
with its recall significantly better compared to other items in WM
for shorter delay periods.
Alternatively, it is possible that the time for which an item
might be elevated to FOA by means of some types of cueing is
limited. This is supported by EEG findings measuring temporal
changes in item representation over the course of a delay period.
LaRocque et al. (2013) employed an identical design to that
of Lewis-Peacock et al. (2011) with EEG, demonstrating that
approximately 1.25 s after cueing the unfocused item, classifi-
cation accuracy for the initially cued item is decreased to levels
comparable to baseline.
RETRO-CUEING
If the item in FOA is disrupted by either having attention switch
to focus on another item in WM (Experiments 1 and 2) or
artificially through TMS to early sensory areas (Zokaei et al.,
2014), the item outside FOA can improve to levels comparable
to the previously privileged item. However, as discussed previ-
ously, this is dependent on context: in the previous experiments
reported above, non-FOA items remained relevant to the task
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in hand. Therefore, the question that remains is what hap-
pens to the other items in WM when they are rendered largely
irrelevant?
Previous literature on this remains controversial (e.g.,
Landman et al., 2003; Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Matsukura et al.,
2007; Rerko and Oberauer, 2013). Due to differences in method-
ology comparison across studies to make meaningful general
conclusions is difficult. To compare both the behavioral influences
of re-focusing attention to other items in WM as well the causal
effects of TMS, we conducted two retro-cueing investigations that
are closely matched in timing and stimuli to two of our previous
studies.
In Experiment 3 we used two successive cues, with the first one
being a retro-cue, informative about the nature of the upcoming
probe (80% validity). To ensure that participants attended to
this cue, the second cue was either a stay or a switch cue, with
20% of the trials a switch cue. Importantly, this second cue was
100% valid, so participants knew for sure which item in WM
was going to be probed. We aimed to investigate whether people
can bring back the previously rendered irrelevant item following
a switch trial. This experiment otherwise matched our double
incidental cueing paradigm (Experiment 1) with two successive
cues in timing and stimuli.
In Experiment 4 we used a similar retro-cue paradigm
to that previously employed by Zokaei et al. (2014) (their
Experiment 2) with an 80% valid rather than an incidental
cue. Transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered dur-
ing WM maintenance following the presentation of the cue
to examine the causal role of early visual areas in main-
tenance of item in different representational states achieved
through retro-cues and importantly its influence on the un-cued
items.
EXPERIMENT 3: STAY OR SWITCH FROM ITEM IN WM THAT
WAS RETRO-CUED
METHODS
Participants
Seventeen healthy individuals (14 Male) with an average age
of 28 (range: 22–34) participated in Experiment 3. All had
normal or corrected to normal vision and reported nor-
mal color vision. Participants provided written consent to the
procedure of the experiment, approved by the local ethics
committee.
Procedure
In each trial, similar to Experiment 1, two RDKs were presented
above and below the fixation cross (300 ms) followed by a mask
(100 ms; see Figure 4A). This was followed by a blank delay of
1000 ms prior to the presentation of the retro-cue, which was in
the form of fixation cross color change (100 ms). The fixation
cross changed from black either to red or green (50% green)
indicating the RDK that was more likely to be the cued later in
the trial (80% validity for the next cue). This was then followed
by a 3000 ms delay, before presentation of the second cue.
The second cue was 100% valid and was in the form of a
word instructing participants to either “stay”, i.e., maintain the
same colored RDK as cued before (80% of trials) or “switch”,
FIGURE 4 | (A) Schematic of trial events for Experiment 3. Memory array is
followed by a retro-cue with 80% validity regarding the 2nd cue. The
second stay/switch cue was 100% valid for the upcoming probe. (B) Recall
precision for the motion direction across conditions—baseline corrected.
Error bars are SEM.
i.e., switch to the other item WM (20% of trials). Note that
in the vast majority of trials, therefore, the first retro-cue
could be used to focus attention largely on one item held in
WM.
Following a 3000 ms interval the item indicated by the second
cue was probed and participants had to adjust the direction of
the probe to match that of the cued item. These trials were
intermixed with 30 baseline trials with no cueing during the
delay but rather a long blank period (7200 ms) before pre-
sentation of the probe. Note that in this experiment, we used
a switch/stay (second) cue in order to make sure participants
attended to the first cue as no response to the that cue was
required.
Participants completed a practice block (30 trials) followed by
five blocks of 46 trials, different conditions randomly intermixed
within a block and were informed of the validity of the cue prior
to testing.
RESULTS
We first applied an ANOVA with cueing condition (valid, no-cue
and invalid) as within-subject factors. There was a marginal effect
of cue-type; F(2,30) = 3.15, p = 0.057. Furthermore, recall precision
was significantly higher in (80%) stay compared to (20%) switch
trials (t(14) = 2.7, p = 0.0.16; Figure 4B). With respect to the
baseline (no-cue) condition, recall precision was not significantly
different in stay trials (t(14) = 0.8, p = 0.4), but significantly
decreased in switch trials (t(14) = 2.45, p = 0.027).
DISCUSSION
In this experiment the item that was initially retro-cued appeared
to be held in a privileged state compared to the other item, which
was effectively rendered largely irrelevant, because it was probed
on only 20% of trials. These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that in situations where items outside FOA in WM
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 853 | 8
Zokaei et al. Flexibility of representational states in working memory
are rendered largely irrelevant by the very low probability of
being probed, they cannot subsequently be brought into FOA—at
least to the level of precision of cued items—by having attention
switched to them. The results are in line with previous experi-
ments using informative cues to direct attention to one/subset of
items in WM (e.g., Lepsien and Nobre, 2007; Matsukura et al.,
2007; Pertzov et al., 2012). Next we used TMS to area MT+ in an
attempt to disrupt the item in FOA.
EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECTS OF TMS TO AREA MT+
METHODS
Participants
Fifteen healthy individuals (8 Male) with average age of 25 (range:
18–32) participated in Experiment 4. All had normal or corrected
to normal vision and reported normal color vision. Participants
provided written consent to the procedure of the experiment,
approved by the local ethics committee.
MT+ localization and TMS
A standard approach to MT+ localization using fMRI was applied
(Huk et al., 2002). Left hemisphere clusters in the vicinity of MT+
(using anatomical guidelines described by Dumoulin et al., 2000)
were identified in the native space of each participant and were
overlaid onto their T1-weighted scan for a Brainsight frameless
stereotaxy procedure (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada). The
participant’s scalp location of left MT+ was marked on their scalp
for subsequent TMS.
Stimulation was delivered via Magtism Rapid2 (The Magstim
Company, Whitland, Wales, U.K.) using a 70-mm figure-eight
coil. The coil handle pointed posteriorly rotated 45º, including a
current approximately in the anterior or posterior direction. On
each trial, 4 TMS pulses at 20 Hz were applied to left MT+ either
at 60% (“high”, effective intensity) or at 24% (“low”, ineffective
intensity) of maximum machine output. Low intensity trials were
used to control for non-specific effects of TMS e.g., acoustic and
tactile artifacts.
Procedure
Similar to Experiments 1 and 3, two RDKs were presented above
and below fixation cross (300 ms) followed by a mask (100 ms;
see Figure 5A) and blank delay (1000 ms). The fixation cross
then changed briefly (similar to Experiment 3), out method of
retro-cueing with 80% validity. This was then followed by a delay
of 2600 ms before the administration of TMS. The TMS train
lasted for 250 ms before presentation of the probe. The probe
matched the color of the retro-cue in 80% of the trials (valid
trials) while in the remaining 20% it did not (invalid trials). Trial
sequence matched closely the timings of Zokaei et al. (2014) (their
Experiment 2).
Participants completed a practice block (30 trials) followed
by four blocks of 104 trials, different conditions randomly inter-
mixed within a block.
RESULTS
In this experiment we compared high intensity (effective) TMS to
low intensity (ineffective) TMS. Recall precision was significantly
higher in valid (i.e., trials in which the probe matched the cue)
FIGURE 5 | (A) Schematic of trial events for Experiment 4. Memory array is
followed by a retro-cue with 80% validity. A 20 Hz four pulse TMS train was
administered to MT+, followed by a delay and the presentation of the
probe. (B) Recall precision for the motion direction across conditions. Error
bars are SEM.
compared to invalid trials (t(14) = 3.2, p = 0.006), indicating
successful retro-cueing (Figure 5B).
We next assessed whether high vs. low intensity TMS affected
recall precision. A two-way ANOVA with factors TMS intensity
and trial type yielded a significant main effect of validity
(F(1,14) = 9.5, p = 0.008) and TMS intensity (F(1,14) = 4.8,
p = 0.045). The effect of TMS was due to a significant decrease
in precision of memory after high intensity TMS on valid
trials (t(14) = 2.4, p = 0.029, n.s after correcting for multiple
comparisons), importantly with no change on invalid trials
(t(14) = 0.7, n.s.). Thus the privileged item sustained a cost with
high intensity TMS. Nevertheless, the behavioral advantage of
validity remained, with memory precision being significantly
higher for valid compared to invalid trials (t(14) = 2.3, p = 0.039,
n.s after correcting for multiple comparisons).
DISCUSSION
The results from the TMS experiment are consistent with the
hypothesis that in situations where items outside FOA in WM
are rendered largely irrelevant by the very low probability of
being probed, they cannot be brought into FOA by disrupt-
ing the item in FOA with TMS. Here, we used an analogous
procedure to that in our previous published study (Zokaei
et al., 2014) with the only distinction of having a retro-cue
rather than an incidental cue. To the best of our knowledge,
that report is one of the first to investigate the causal role
of early visual areas in maintenance of the retro-cued item in
WM demonstrating that the maintenance of the cued item, in
line with previous imaging studies (Lepsien and Nobre, 2007;
Harrison and Tong, 2009; Nelissen et al., 2013), relies to some
extent on visual areas involved in its perception (Zokaei et al.,
2014).
In the current experiment, TMS to MT+ did not have an
effect on the other item retained in WM, unlike the previously
observed result with an incidental cue (Zokaei et al., 2014). In the
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study reported here, there was no improvement in recall precision
for the other item in memory presumably because high quality
information regarding this item was lost because of the extremely
low (20%) probability of being probed. It is, however, important
to note that the smaller number of invalid relative to valid trials
may also explain the lack of TMS effect on the invalid condition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies reported here sought to investigate the flexibility of
representational states in WM: whether retained information can
be flexibly moved in and out of the privileged state of FOA. Across
four experiments, we explicitly and implicitly manipulated the
state of two items in WM using different methods in order to place
one in the FOA. Taken together, our results suggest that although
the item in FOA is represented with higher recall precision com-
pared to the non-privileged items in all experiments, the nature
of the other items in WM crucially depends on the relevance of
these items to the WM task. The context in which people are
required to hold more than one item in WM makes a difference
to how flexibly they can switch attention to non-focused items
and improve their precision of recall. Also interesting to note is
that the item in FOA was never recalled with greater precision
than uncued items in the baseline condition. This suggests that the
benefit conferred by the FOA is not necessarily due to straightfor-
ward increase in the precision with which the item is maintained
compared to all other items. Indeed, this result fits with those of
Gorgoraptis et al. (2011) in which recall precision of the last item
in the sequence (i.e., the item in FOA) was similar to the precision
of items when presented simultaneously regardless of memory set
size. The implication is therefore that the FOA benefit may also
depend on the context of the experiment.
In Experiment 1 we used either one or two consecutive
incidental cues to explicitly bring the cued item into FOA: by
requiring participants to make an action regarding a feature
(in this case, location) of one of the retained items during WM
delay period. The consequence of such incidental cueing is that
this item, if probed later (congruent condition), will be recalled
with higher precision than if the alternative item is probed
(incongruent condition) (Zokaei et al., 2014). In Experiment 2
we used sequential presentation of the memory array followed by
an incidental cue (in this case regarding, serial order), with the
assumption that the last item in the sequence was in the privileged
state by virtue of recency. Our working hypothesis, based on
previous published studies discussed in the Section Introduction,
is that the last cue in both these experiments places the cued item
in the FOA. But importantly it carries no information regarding
the relevance of the cued item for the upcoming WM task.
The results from these two studies demonstrated that in fact in
situations where the item outside FOA remains potentially relevant
to the task in hand, it can be brought back into the privileged
state. Theoretically, these findings are in line with predictions
made by the three-embedded components theory (Oberauer,
2002, 2009; Rerko and Oberauer, 2013) where no permanent
detrimental effect on the other items in WM is predicted.
In the context of this theoretical framework, the decrease in
recall precision of the unfocused items might be due to direct
interference from the item in FOA (e.g., Pertzov et al., 2012).
Thus abolishing such interference, either through disruptive
effects of TMS (Zokaei et al., 2014) or by re-focusing attention
on non-privileged items (as in Experiments 1 and 2 here), can
increase their WM precision to levels comparable to baseline.
If the items outside FOA are indeed maintained and can be
brought back into FOA, then what are the mechanisms underlying
their retention? A few studies have demonstrated a role of the
hippocampus in maintenance of items outside FOA, with their
retrieval accompanied by activation in MTL (Oztekin et al., 2009,
2010; Nee and Jonides, 2011). Consistent with such observations,
patients with hippocampal sclerosis have impaired WM perfor-
mance only for items presented earlier in the sequence, that is
items outside the FOA (López-Frutos et al., 2014). Alternatively,
it has been suggested that the maintenance of unfocused items
is supported either through sustained rapid short-term synaptic
plasticity (Mongillo et al., 2008; Buonomano and Maass, 2009;
Stokes et al., 2013) or sustained neuronal firing in non-sensory
regions (Fuster and Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995).
However, support for each of these accounts is sparse and the
brain mechanisms by which an item is brought into FOA have
yet to be elucidated.
Unlike in the first two experiments, in Experiments 3 and
4 we manipulated representational states using retro-cues, i.e.,
cues that appear to focus attention on the most relevant item
in WM for the upcoming probe. In Experiment 3, we used
two consecutive cues: the first one was a retro-cue, informing
participants on the likely nature of the second cue with 80%
validity. The second cue was 100% valid for the WM probe. Recall
precision for the invalidly cued WM item (i.e., the item probed
on only 20% of trials) was significantly lower compared to the
validly cued one, despite having attention switch to this item with
a second 100% valid retro-cue. Therefore, the irrelevant item in
WM following a retro-cue could not be brought back into FOA,
despite having attention focus on it via the second retro-cue. Thus
some information was, to some extent, irretrievably lost from
WM following the initial retro-cue.
In Experiment 4, the precision of memory for the
other/irrelevant items did not improve following disruptive
effects of TMS to the item in FOA, unlike previous studies using
incidental cueing or sequential presentation of items (Zokaei
et al., 2014). However, while the probability of being probed
regarding the invalid item was extremely low (20%) in the TMS
study we report here, in the incidental cueing study of Zokaei
et al. (2014), there was a 50% probability of being probed on the
uncued item.
In that report, the improvement of memory for the non-
FOA item in WM following TMS was described in terms of
weakening of the interference from the item in FOA on the non-
privileged item. According to this hypothesis, TMS abolished
the advantage of the item in FOA, leaving “baseline” WM per-
formance intact and resulting in normalized performance for
all items in WM. In accordance with such hypothesis, in the
retro-cueing TMS study reported here (Experiment 4), “baseline”
performance for the non-FOA items was decreased due to valid-
ity of the cue, prior to the administration of TMS. Abolishing
the interference of item in the privileged state would therefore
not be expected to improve the quality of the memory for the
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non-FOA item since it is maintained with low precision to begin
with.
Findings from previous studies are not all consistent. Few
have reported a cueing advantage (Lepsien and Nobre, 2007;
Matsukura et al., 2007; Pertzov et al., 2012) while others have
failed to observe one (Landman et al., 2003; Rerko and Oberauer,
2013). Current findings however can potentially explain such
discrepancy in the literature if one considers the amount of
information conveyed by the retro-cue regarding the likelihood of
being probed on uncued items. In experiments that demonstrate
a cueing advantage, the cue was valid, i.e., the cued item was later
probed in majority of trials. On the other hand, in studies that
have failed to report any effect of cueing, the cue was only 50%
valid and hence no different to a no cue condition. In addition,
some studies using two consecutive cues have no method of
confirming whether participants attended to the cues or not (e.g.,
Landman et al., 2003; Rerko and Oberauer, 2013), unlike the
methods used here. Together these factors may well contribute to
the inconsistency in the literature.
Our findings, in light of previous literature, suggest that the
magnitude of cueing is dependent on the amount of information
conveyed by the cue—the context in which WM holds items.
Future research might aim to directly test this hypothesis by
varying the validity of the cue systematically, although as the
frequency of invalid cues is reduced the number of trials required
to generate sufficient data would increase massively. Furthermore,
current advances in modeling the sources of error associated
with a specific pattern of performance may shed light on possible
mechanisms that an item gains its privileged state (Bays et al.,
2009). Similar findings with memory set sizes larger than two
are also essential in building a comprehensive understanding of
flexibility of representational states in WM.
The findings reported here also have important implica-
tions for both theoretical and neural computational models of
WM. Although some have proposed dynamic representational
states of items during WM retention (Fujisawa et al., 2008;
Barak et al., 2010; Pascanu and Jaeger, 2011; Stokes et al.,
2013), most models assume static representations (Seung and
Sompolinsky, 1993; Lisman et al., 1998; Compte et al., 2000;
Durstewitz et al., 2000; Mongillo et al., 2008; Dempere-Marco
et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2012). Our results provide support for
remarkable flexibility of representations in WM dependent upon
context, and its close relationship to directed attention. More-
over, state-models of WM do not often make the distinction
between other/non-privileged items in WM in different con-
texts, assuming a similar fate for all these items irrespective of
how they have achieved their state. Our results provide strong
empirical support for differential effects of cue validity—context
of the WM task—on the nature of items outside FOA. Given
the compelling evidence provided here, both computational and
theoretical models of WM might profitably take into account
dynamic representational states in WM when several items are
retained.
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